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Abstract: A central tenet of medical ethics holds that it is permissible to perform a medical 
intervention on a competent individual only if that individual has given informed consent to the 
intervention. Yet, it occasionally seems morally permissible to carry out non-consensual medical 
interventions on competent individuals for the purpose of infectious disease control (IDC). We 
describe two different moral frameworks that have been invoked in support of non-consensual IDC 
interventions, and identify five desiderata that might be used to guide the assessments of the moral 
permissibility of such interventions on either kind of fundamental justification. We then consider what 
these desiderata imply for the justifiability of carrying out non-consensual medical interventions that 
are designed to facilitate rehabilitation amongst serious criminal offenders. We argue that this analysis 
suggests that a plausible case can be made in favour of such interventions. 
 
 
A central tenet of medical ethics holds that it is permissible to perform a medical 
intervention on a competent individual only if that individual has given informed consent to 
the intervention. However, in some circumstances it is tempting to say that the moral 
requirement to obtain informed consent prior to administering a medical intervention is 
outweighed. For example, if an individual’s refusal to undergo a medical intervention would 
lead to the transmission of a dangerous infectious disease to other members of the 
community, we might claim that it would be morally permissible to administer the 
intervention, even in the absence of consent. Indeed, as we shall discuss below, there are a 
number of examples of public health authorities implementing compulsory or coercive 
measures for the purposes of infectious disease control (IDC).  
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The plausibility of the thought that non-consensual medical interventions might be 
justified when performed for the purpose of infectious disease control (IDC) raises the 
question of whether such interventions might permissibly be used to realise other public 
goods. In this paper we focus on one possibility: whether it could be permissible to non-
consensually impose certain interventions that alter brain states or processes through 
chemical or physical means on serious criminal offenders. We shall suggest that some such 
interventions might be permissible if they safely and effectively served to facilitate the 
offender’s rehabilitation, and thereby prevent criminal recidivism.i We refer to brain 
interventions intended to serve these objectives as ‘neurocorrectives’. 
Authorities in certain jurisdictions have already begun to explore the use of 
neurocorrectives. For instance, drug-addicted offenders are sometimes compelled to take 
medications that are intended to attenuate their addictive desires ii and sex-offenders in some 
jurisdictions may be compelled to take testosterone-lowering drugs as a part of their criminal 
sentence or as a condition of their parole.iii Moreover, as our understanding of the neural 
correlates of violent behavior increases, it seems plausible to claim that we might develop 
effective neurocorrectives that involve the use of other pharmaceuticalsiv	   or novel 
technologies such as deep brain stimulation,v transcranial magnetic stimulation, vi and neuro-
feedback.vii 
There has been increasing ethical debate over the deployment of neurocorrectives.viii 
Much of this debate has focused on their safety and effectiveness. We shall not examine these 
issues here. We simply assume, for the sake of argument, that the interventions we consider 
are both effective and have negligible side-effects.ix Other critics have questioned whether an 
offender could validly consent to undergoing such an intervention, if doing so were a 
condition of their early release from prison x. In this paper, we side-step this contentious issue 
by assuming that the hypothetical recipients of neurocorrectives have not validly consented to 
	   2	  
undergoing the intervention. Instead, we shall argue that the considerations standardly offered 
in support of non-consensual interventions in IDC also offer considerable support to the 
permissibility of some safe and effective non-consensual neurocorrectives.xi  
First, however, some definitions. We shall adopt a definition of ‘medical 
interventions’ that is perhaps broader than colloquial use, since we shall understand it to refer 
not only to typical medical procedures such as pharmacotherapies and surgical procedures—
measures that involve some degree of bodily invasion——but also measures that restrict an 
individual’s freedom of movement and association, insofar as these are used for medical 
reasons. For instance, we shall understand quarantine to qualify as a ‘medical intervention’. 
We will use the term ‘IDC interventions’ to refer to medical interventions performed for the 
purposes of infectious disease control.  
We shall use the term ‘non-consensual intervention’ to refer to any intervention 
performed without the valid consent of the recipient of the intervention. It is possible to 
distinguish a number of different kinds of non-consensual intervention. For instance, one 
might draw a distinction between compelled and coerced interventions. Following Feinberg, 
we may say that “ . . . an option is closed by compulsion when one alternative has been made 
impossible”.xii For instance, an individual may be compelled to undergo an intervention by 
being subjected to direct physical force. A compelled intervention is carried out without the 
recipient’s consent, and perhaps even despite his dissent. In contrast to compulsion, coercion 
does not make an alternative impossible, but rather destroys its appeal by increasing its 
cost.xiii In contrast to the case of compulsion, in coercion, the individual does consent to the 
intervention, but the coercive pressure to which he has been subjected may invalidate that 
consent. We use the term ‘non-consensual’ intervention to refer both to interventions 
performed without consent, and to interventions performed with invalid consent.  
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I	   Non-­‐‑Consensual	  Interventions	  in	  IDC	  	  	  
	  
 
The putative requirement to obtain consent before performing a medical intervention 
is standardly thought to derive from a reason to respect the prospective patient’s rights, which 
may include rights to personal autonomy and rights to freedom from bodily interference. 
Performing a medical intervention non-consensually is thought to be impermissible because it 
violates one or more of these rights.xiv In the IDC cases of interest to us, this reason to respect 
the patient’s rights plausibly remains in place (it has not been forfeited). However, there is 
also a powerful reason to impose the medical intervention, since it will help to forestall the 
spread of an infectious disease. In a number of historical cases, this reason has been thought 
by many to either outweigh reasons to respect the individual’s rights, or to deprive these 
rights of their normal protective force, with the result that the intervention may permissibly 
be imposed non-consensually.  
One type of medical intervention that has often been used for the purposes of IDC is 
vaccination. Vaccinations are amongst the most effective IDC interventions that societies can 
employ. For instance, broad vaccination coverage is largely responsible for the widespread 
immunity to measles and tetanus in modern society, and it led to the eradication of smallpox 
in the late twentieth century.xv Barring adverse side-effects, which are uncommon for most 
vaccines, and cases where an individual is insusceptible to the negative effects of an 
infectious disease, being vaccinated is typically beneficial to the vaccinated individual, since 
an effective vaccine will normally confer immunity to a particular infectious disease. 
However, effective individual immunization also confers benefits to third parties; if a 
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sufficient proportion of the population is immunized against a disease then this can disrupt 
the spread of the disease from person to person. In such a scenario of ‘herd immunity’, the 
fact that a sufficient majority of the population is immune to a particular disease confers a 
degree of protection even to those who have not been vaccinated.xvi 
 In light of this, some countries employ laws that could be described as introducing 
coercive pressure on individuals to undergo vaccination, insofar as they permit the imposition 
of costs for vaccine refusal.xvii  For instance, in the majority of states in the USA, children 
must normally complete a vaccination schedule as a condition of entering public school. xviii 
In some cases, it might be claimed that if the operative reason undergirding an individual’s 
choice to undergo the vaccination is that they want to avoid these state-imposed costs of non-
compliance (rather than, say, because they want the health benefits of being vaccinated), then 
that individual may qualify as being coerced in a manner that invalidates their consent.xix 
Vaccinations aim to prevent the spread of infectious disease by preventing individuals 
from becoming infected in the first place. However, states also impose other sorts of non-
consensual medical intervention for IDC purposes. For example, in some jurisdictions it is 
legally permissible to compel the medical examination (and in rare cases even treatment) of 
persons suspected of carrying an infectious disease.xx xxi The non-consensual examination and 
treatment of individuals carrying a dangerous infectious disease can aid IDC in two ways. 
First, effectively treating that individual will mean that that they will no longer be able to 
transmit the disease to others. Second, it can help to restrict the development of drug resistant 
pathogens, since one way in which a pathogen can develop drug resistance is by genetically 
evolving as a result of an incomplete treatment.xxii 
Although exerting coercive pressure to undergo vaccinations and even compelling 
medical examinations and treatments is permitted in some jurisdictions, these are somewhat 
controversial non-consensual IDC interventions. The use of non-consensual quarantine and 
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isolation however is often deemed to be less controversial (for reasons that we shall explore 
below). Both quarantine and isolation share the aim of separating certain individuals from the 
rest of the community in order to prevent or limit the transmission of infectious pathogens. 
The difference between the two lies in the diagnostic status of the detainee; in isolation, it is 
known that the detainee is infected, whereas quarantine involves the detention of individuals 
who have been (or are likely to have been) exposed to the infectious agent and are thus 
suspected of being (but not known to be) infected. Quarantine and isolation have long been 
used in response to outbreaks of infectious disease, particularly those for which no effective 
medical treatment is available.xxiii For instance, quarantine was widely used in response to the 
recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa.  
	  
II	   Approaches	   To	   The	   Moral	   Justification	   of	   Non-­‐‑Consensual	   Medical	  
Interventions	  
	  
In this section we shall delineate two standard moral justifications for non-consensual 
medical interventions in IDC: the constrained consequentialist justification, and the self-
defence justification. We then identify some desiderata for assessing IDC interventions that 
can be regarded as common ground between these two justifications, before, in the 
subsequent section, arguing that these desiderata support the justifiability of at least some 
non-consensual neurocorrectives. 
It might be argued that non-consensual interventions in IDC can be morally justified 
by appealing to classic utilitarian reasoning. On such a view, these interventions would be 
permissible if they are predicted to bring about at least as much aggregate happiness as any 
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alternative course of action. However, few have been persuaded by such justifications. As T. 
M. Wilkinson points out, this sort of utilitarian thinking runs contrary to the belief, 
commonly held in biomedical ethics, that people have certain rights that “constrain the 
pursuit of the greater good”.xxiv  Many theorists reject the simple utilitarian approach because 
of its failure to accommodate this belief, amongst others; indeed, some may claim that this 
failure gives us reason to be sceptical of making any consequentialist considerations central 
to the justification of either medical or criminal justice interventions, the two types of 
intervention with which we are concerned in this paper. We shall now set out two alternative 
justifications to which they have turned, which are both compatible with the belief that rights 
should constrain the pursuit of the good, but which may nonetheless have been used to justify 
certain non-consensual interventions in IDC. 
The first justification retains a broadly consequentialist approach but incorporates a 
richer account of the good than the utilitarian’s appeal to happiness, and sets certain side-
constraints on the pursuit of this good. We shall call this the ‘constrained consequentialist 
approach’. Lawrence Gostin offers an example of it in his influential Public Health Law: 
Duty, Power and Restraint. In introducing his account, Gostin writes: 
 
The prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible level of physical 
and mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice.  
 
He later expands on this claim by suggesting that the twin aims that motivate public health 
interventions are “to advance human well-being by improving health, and to do so 
particularly by focusing on the needs of the most disadvantaged”.xxv  
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These passages suggest that Gostin deviates from utilitarianism in two respects. 
Though, like the utilitarian, he believes that interventions must promote individual well-
being, his appeals to social justice and the needs of the most disadvantaged suggest that, 
unlike the utilitarian, he does not regard aggregate utility as the sole determinant of the good 
but instead believes that the distribution of well-being across individuals should be 
incorporated into the theory of the good. Moreover, the claim that the objective of public 
health law is to pursue high levels of health in a manner that is consistent with the values of 
social justice leaves open the possibility that the pursuit of good outcomes may be side-
constrained—that is to say, there may be certain means to pursuing those outcomes that are 
ruled out, regardless how good their effects would be. The nature of the constraints will 
depend on the theory of social justice that one adopts in cashing out the framework. Notably 
in claiming that public health ought to focus on the ‘needs of the most disadvantaged’, Gostin 
himself seems to implicitly endorse a fundamentally prioritarian account of social justice. 
Prioritarians might set strict constraints on the pursuit of the good by claiming that our 
pursuit of general well-being should be constrained by the principle that we must not select 
any option in which the worst off individuals will be worse off than the worst off individuals 
in any alternative distribution.  
A second approach to the justification of non-consensual IDC interventions treats the 
imposition of such interventions as an instance of justified self-defence. We may say that an 
agent is acting in self-defence if she is acting to prevent another (the ‘attacker’) from harming 
her.xxvi In the context of IDC, it has been suggested that it may be legitimate to think of an 
infected (or potentially infected) individual as an ‘attacker’, and other members of the public 
as potential victims who may be justified in defending themselves against the attacker, by, for 
example, imposing an IDC intervention.xxvii 
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In what follows, we will not seek to adjudicate between constrained consequentialist 
and self-defence justifications for IDC interventions. Rather, we will deploy five desiderata 
that are commonly used to guide decisions regarding the deployment of non-consensual IDC 
interventions, and that are compatible with either kind of fundamental justification. We take 
these desiderata to collectively constitute the standard approach to decision-making regarding 
IDC interventions. We also take them to constitute indicators rather than determinants of the 
moral permissibility of public health interventions.  These desiderata do not determine what 
is the right and wrong in IDC; rather, they constitute a practically applicable set of heuristics 
that agents operationalising either of these fundamental justifications may apply in order to 
guide their assessments of permissibility. Furthermore, it should be noted that, though the 
desiderata we shall outline are consistent with both constrained consequentialist and self-
defence justifications, their interpretation may depend on which of these fundamental 
justifications one accepts. As we wish to remain neutral between these fundamental 
justifications, we will, where necessary, leave open whether these desiderata should be 
interpreted in line with a constrained consequentialist or a self-defence approach.  
	  
III	   Five	  Desiderata	  To	  Guide	  The	  Moral	  Assessment	  of	  Non-­‐‑Consensual	  
Medical	  Interventions	  
 
The first desideratum is the gravity—by which we mean the moral weight— of the 
harm that the intervention aims to prevent. This may depend, inter alia, on the magnitude of 
the harm, its qualitative importance, the likelihood or certainty with which it will occur, and 
its impact on distributive fairness.xxviii The graver the harm, the easier it will be to justify the 
intervention.  
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The second desideratum is the effectiveness of the intervention in preventing the 
harm. In IDC, this will depend on the nature of the infectious disease, the nature of the 
intervention, and the context in which the intervention is to be deployed. Consider, for 
instance, the attempt to limit the spread of infectious disease by imposing mass quarantine; 
this will only be effective in preventing the spread of an infectious agent if it is possible to 
identify people likely to be incubating the infection, and if those people comply with the 
conditions of quarantine. Furthermore, the infectious agent must be transmissible in its pre-
symptomatic or early symptomatic stages for quarantine to be useful in preventing further 
transmission.xxix xxx  
A third desideratum is that they have low opportunity costs.  The expenditure of 
economic resources on a public health intervention necessarily diverts funds from other 
potentially beneficial public projects, including projects that might themselves promote 
public health. xxxi The opportunity cost of an intervention is the value of the alternative use to 
which the resources invested in the intervention would otherwise have been put. The higher 
the opportunity cost, the more difficult it will be to justify the intervention. In many cases, 
determining the opportunity cost of an intervention is difficult because it is unclear how the 
resources would otherwise be spent. However, even in those cases it may be possible to make 
a (necessarily uncertain) estimate of the expected opportunity costs. Moreover, in other cases, 
opportunity costs are quite clear: consider the position of a committee that has been given a 
fixed budget to spend on fighting a new pandemic, and is assessing competing proposals for 
the use of those funds.  
The fourth and fifth desiderata are less straightforward so will be described in greater 
detail. The fourth desideratum is that the IDC intervention is the ‘least restrictive’ of the 
available alternatives for preventing the harm. As the discussion in section I makes clear, 
	   10	  
many effective IDC interventions can impose significant burdens on the individuals that they 
target. In overriding a competent individual’s refusal to consent, we arguably infringe his 
right to autonomy, and we may, depending on the intervention, also infringe other moral 
rights such as rights to bodily integrity, and freedom of movement and association. In view of 
this, it has been suggested that public health authorities should realise their IDC goals 
through the use of ‘least restrictive alternative’ of the available options. xxxii xxxiii  
  The definition of ‘restrictiveness’ here has important ramifications for the moral 
foundations of a ‘least restrictive alternative’ desideratum. It might be claimed that the 
restrictiveness of an intervention depends on the extent to which it infringes upon the 
recipient’s moral rights.xxxiv Notably, the understanding of rights that such an account might 
invoke need not assume that rights must trump all other considerations; an intervention may 
be permissible (on broadly consequentialist grounds or grounds of self-defence) even if it 
infringes another’s rights, as long as it is the intervention that infringes rights to the least 
extent of all available (effective) interventions. Of course, how the ‘extent’ of rights 
infringements is to be determined is open to debate. 
On this interpretation, the least restrictive alternative desideratum may be regarded as 
reflecting a deontological constraint on either the pursuit of the good (on constrained 
consequentialism), or self-protection (on a self-defence-based justification). In either case, it 
is an interpretation that is most naturally understood in deontological terms. However, some 
may be suspicious at the invocation of ‘rights’ that this interpretation makes. An alternative 
interpretation of the least restrictive alternative desideratum might instead claim that the 
restrictiveness of the intervention depends on the extent to which the intervention harms the 
subject, for instance by frustrating certain interests they may have. On this reading, the least 
restrictive alternative desideratum may be understood to be highlighting the harms that non-
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consensual interventions can cause to the recipients of the intervention. On either a 
constrained consequentialist or self-defence justification, these harms inflicted by the 
intervention weigh against the harms that it averts (captured by the first desideratum) in 
determining its justifiability.  
This brings us to the fifth desideratum, which is that the intervention must be 
proportionate to the threat that the recipient of the intervention poses to others. This 
desideratum is most strongly associated with self-defence justifications, where the 
desideratum (understood as a guide to practical decision-making) can be seen as a direct 
operationalisation of a proportionality requirement at the level of fundamental justification; 
self-defence accounts make the permissibility of protective measures dependant on the 
existence of proportionality. We will thus begin by briefly outlining how proportionality has 
been understood within self-defence justifications, before suggesting that a proportionality 
desideratum for non-consensual medical interventions can be accepted by proponents of a 
constrained consequentialist approach too, even though this approach includes no 
proportionality requirement at the level of fundamental justification.   
Jeff McMahan succinctly captures the requirement of proportionality in self-defence in 
the following way: 
The requirement of proportionality holds, roughly, that the harm inflicted in self‐defence must not be 
excessive in relation to the threatened harm one seeks to avoid. xxxv  
 
In order to establish whether a harm inflicted in self-defence is excessive, one must first 
assess the relative gravity of the harm inflicted by an act of self-defence, and the harm that 
the attacker can be expected to inflict in the absence of self-defence. On the ‘equivalent harm 
view’ of proportionality, self-defence is proportionate only if the “harm that the force is 
intended to fend off is at least equivalent to the harm inflicted on the attacker”.xxxvi  On this 
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view, inflicting fatal force in self-defence is only proportionate when doing so is intended to 
fend off a harm that is itself as grave as death.  
However, other views take further factors into account. For instance, it might be argued 
that assessments of proportionality should acknowledge that the attacker may be liable to 
suffer defensive force by virtue of his culpability (or, on some views, his mere 
responsibility)xxxvii	   for the threat he poses, whilst the victim is not liable to suffer the 
threatened harm.xxxviii On McMahan’s justice-based account, this asymmetry makes it 
permissible, as a matter of justice, to ensure that the threatening party, rather than the 
potential victim, suffers any harm necessitated by the threat posed.xxxix Moreover, on this 
view, the stringency of the proportionality restriction on the use of defensive force may vary 
in accordance with the threatening party’s degree of culpability (or moral responsibility) for 
the threat that he poses.xl For our purposes here, the important implication of justice-based 
views of proportionality is that they allows for the possibility that it can be justifiable for an 
agent acting in self-defence to harm a morally responsible attacker more than the attacker 
would otherwise harm her.  
In contrast to self-defence justifications, the idea of proportionality is arguably not 
fundamental to most constrained consequentialist justifications of IDC interventions. 
However assessing whether an intervention can be justified on the constrained 
consequentialist approach requires assessing the net harmfulness of the intervention, where 
the most significant harms are likely to be harms to others that the intervention can be 
expected to prevent, and the harms that the intervention imposes on the recipient. Ceteris 
paribus, an intervention will be justified, on this approach, only if the expected harm to 
others that is averted is greater than the harm inflicted on the recipient, and this, on one 
interpretation (the equivalent harm view), is precisely what the proportionality desideratum 
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requires. Satisfaction of the desideratum, thus interpreted, can therefore be regarded as an 
indicator of whether an IDC intervention can be justified on the constrained consequentialist 
approach.xli  
Certain constrained consequentialist approaches could also accommodate a 
proportionality desideratum that goes beyond the equivalent harm view and sanctions 
interventions that cause more harm than they prevent. For instance, a constrained 
consequentialist approach that incorporated desert into its account of the good could regard 
harms to culpable agents as less inimical to the good (because less underserved) than harms 
to innocent agents.xlii xliii  
 It should be acknowledged that our use of the concept of proportionality here differs 
from the way in which proportionality is commonly invoked by retributivists in the criminal 
justice context. In this latter context, proportionality is commonly understood retrospectively; 
in order to ascertain whether a punishment is proportionate, we have to make a comparison 
between the harms that will be imposed by that punishment, and the gravity of the wrong 
involved in the offender’s past action. In the case of retrospective proportionality 
assessments, we already know what crime the individual committed, and have to judge what 
sort of punishment is proportionate to that known harm. In contrast, we are invoking 
proportionality in a prospective sense; in order to ascertain whether a preventative 
intervention that we are now going to impose is proportionate, we have to make a comparison 
between the harm that will be imposed by this intervention, and the harm that the individual 
will otherwise bring about in their future action.xliv This arguably introduces epistemic 
difficulties; we may face barriers to knowing the extent of the harm that the agent will bring 
about, as well as her degree of culpability for it. 
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IV	   The	   Justification	   of	   Non-­‐‑Consensual	   IDC	   Interventions	   and	  
Neurocorrectives	  
 
Having outlined the five desiderata that we take to constitute the standard approach to 
the assessment of nonconsensual IDC interventions, we shall now consider what this 
approach might imply regarding the justification of non-consensual neurocorrectives, 
assuming that it is apt for the moral assessment of such interventions. Our discussion of non-
consensual IDC interventions in the previous section suggests that there may be some 
circumstances in which it may be permissible to impose medical interventions non-
consensually. For the sake of argument, we shall assume that the non-consensual IDC 
interventions surveyed above are all permissible. We shall argue that considerations 
pertaining to the gravity of harm targeted, effectiveness, and opportunity costs count in 
favour of non-consensual neurocorrectives, just as they count in favour of the putatively 
permissible non-consensual IDC interventions surveyed above, including quarantine, 
coercive vaccination programmes and forced treatment. We shall then consider whether the 
least restrictive alternative and proportionality desiderata can be invoked to rule out the 
permissibility of neurocorrectives in a manner that cannot be applied to non-consensual IDC 
interventions. We shall argue that although some neurocorrectives would be more restrictive 
than other available methods for preventing recidivism, this is neither clearly the case for all 
neurocorrectives, nor clearly sufficient for establishing that these interventions would be 
impermissible. Similarly, we shall argue that some neurointerventions would not, in many 
cases, clearly be disproportionate to the harms they are intended to prevent.  
In the preceding section, we outlined five desiderata that may be used to guide the 
moral assessment of non-consensual IDC interventions. One potential obstacle facing the 
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translation of a moral framework from public health ethics to the context of criminal justice is 
that interventions in the latter context may have different aims. For instance, on retributive 
approaches to criminal justice, the purpose of criminal justice is to ensure that the offender 
gets his ‘just deserts’. Such approaches are backwards-looking in the sense that they claim 
that the appropriateness of a particular correctional intervention depends ultimately on the 
offender’s past conduct (that which renders them deserving of hard treatment) not on the 
effects of the intervention. As such, retributivism naturally contrasts with ‘forward-looking’ 
consequentialist approaches to criminal justice, which claim that the appropriateness of a 
particular correctional intervention is to be determined by whether it will lead to good 
consequences. Strict retributivists are unlikely to be convinced that a public health moral 
framework is suitable for adoption within the criminal justice system insofar as it does not 
incorporate backwards-looking retributive elements that they deem to be central to criminal 
justice. 
Naturally, we cannot settle debates about the justification and aims of criminal justice 
here. However, it should be acknowledged that rehabilitation has been understood to be a 
central goal of criminal justice on a wide range of not only consequentialist penal theories,xlv 
but also by non-consequentialist moral education and paternalistic theories of punishment.xlvi 
Furthermore, we do not mean to claim that rehabilitation is the only goal of criminal justice; 
rather, we are claiming that insofar as rehabilitation is aptly construed as an appropriate goal 
of criminal justice (as it is on many theories), then this framework may be used to guide our 
moral assessments of how we may permissibly intervene in order to promote the 
rehabilitation. This is quite compatible with claiming that criminal justice ought also to 
incorporate other retributive elements; those who make this claim might feel it necessary to 
impose other forms of intervention on offenders in order to meet these aims, and to 
supplement the framework we present here with backwards-looking considerations that limit 
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the sorts of interventions that we may impose in the name of retributivism. The comparative 
weight that the desiderata we present here will bear against other retributive desiderata (such 
as retrospective proportionality) will depend on the comparative weight that one affords to 
retributive aims and justifications of punishment more generally.  
Furthermore, the desiderata that we have presented may be justified by either a 
constrained consequentialist approach or a deontologically-grounded theory of self defence. 
Notably, the latter can be understood as integrating both retributive and crime-prevention 
elements, since on this approach, force may only permissibly be used on aggressors (thus 
satisfying the retributivist’s desert requirement), even if the primary purpose is to avert 
harm.xlvii Moreover, even when the desiderata are understood as being undergirded by a 
constrained consequentialist theory, the approach is not vulnerable to some of the criticisms 
of advocating rehabilitation as a central unconstrained consequentialist aim of punishment. 
For instance, one such criticism is that an unconstrained consequentialist approach would 
seem to allow for any sort of harsh treatment that would achieve the goal of rehabilitation, 
including interventions that would traditionally be ruled out as disproportionate by retributive 
approaches. However, the constrained consequentialist approach that we have outlined can 
avoid this criticism by incorporating proportionality requirement that limits the sorts of 
interventions we may impose on offenders in the name of rehabilitation.xlviii 
Let us turn, then, to applying the five desiderata outlined in the previous section to the 
case of neurocorrectives’. Consider first the gravity of the harm that neurocorrectives seek to 
prevent. It seems plausible to claim that neurocorrectives could be used to prevent serious 
harms, since many crimes cause serious harm (both physical and mental) to their victims. 
Indeed, in some cases (most obviously in the case of murder), the harm caused to the victim 
may be comparable in seriousness to the harm of their contracting a lethal infectious disease. 
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Furthermore, criminal offending leads to other indirect costs for other members of society, 
since resources must be spent in order to, inter alia, provide support to victims of crime and 
apprehend and punish criminal offenders; in the UK, the cost to the taxpayer of reoffending is 
estimated to be £9.5 to £13 billion per year. xlix 
However, even if criminal offending often causes harm to its victims, it might be 
argued that there are nonetheless significant differences between the harms caused by 
criminal offending and the harms caused by the spread of infectious disease. First, it might be 
claimed that the likelihood that the harm will occur in the absence of intervention is typically 
higher in IDC than it is in criminal justice: we cannot predict whether a criminal offender will 
re-offend with the same degree of accuracy with which we can predict that an individual 
carrying an infectious disease will transmit it to others. Although various risk assessment 
instruments have been used to assist sentencing and release decisions in both the US and the 
UKl, there are a number of well-documented problems with them.li Recidivism can thus 
currently be predicted only with limited accuracy, and ‘false positive’ assessments are likely 
in this context.lii  
However, this does not mean that the harms associated with criminal recidivism can 
be predicted with less confidence than those associated with infectious disease; public health 
authorities sometimes have to use risk-prediction instruments that have comparably limited 
predictive accuracy. Consider cases in which the transmission of an infectious agent depends 
on the vector engaging in certain behaviours, such as in sexually transmitted infections. 
Assessing whether an infected individual poses a threat to public health, authorities must 
assess the risk of that agent’s engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse. It seems doubtful 
that they could make such an assessment with a significantly greater degree of certainty than 
an assessment of whether a violent criminal offender is likely to re-
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which public health authorities may face significant uncertainty in their predictions of threats 
to public health is in the implementation of quarantine. In quarantine, healthy individuals can 
be subjected to compulsory detention just because they have been exposed to an infectious 
agent, even though they themselves may not be infected, and the threat they actually pose to 
others is thus uncertain.  
 Nonetheless, as we described above, individuals carrying sexually transmitted 
infections have been subjected to non-consensual treatment in the name of public health in 
certain jurisdictions, and quarantine is widely practiced across various jurisdictions. As such, 
on the assumption that these interventions are morally permissible, the mere fact that the 
prediction of criminal recidivism might be highly uncertain is not in itself sufficient for 
establishing that the IDC moral framework cannot appropriately be applied in an assessment 
compulsory neurocorrectives; the prediction of infectious disease risks may also be highly 
uncertain.  
Alternatively, it might be argued that the aggregate magnitude of the harm that could 
be prevented through the use of non-consensual neurocorrectives is minimal in comparison to 
that which could be prevented through the use of non-consensual IDC interventions. The 
latter often aim to prevent the spread of serious infectious diseases that might otherwise have 
the capacity to spread throughout a large population. In contrast, whilst criminal re-offending 
might entail certain indirect economic costs, it seems that an individual offender is likely to 
only cause serious direct individual harm to a small number of people in comparison to the 
large numbers of people who would be caused such harms by the spread of an infectious 
disease. 
The strength of this argument turns on two empirical claims; first, that the scope of 
the harm caused by individual offenders is likely to be small, and second, the claim that 
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permissible non-consensual IDC interventions prevent harms with large scope. However, it is 
not clear that either claim is universally true. First, it seems possible that a criminal offender 
could be likely to directly harm a large number of people, for instance if the offender has 
previously been convicted of terrorist offences. Second, non-consensual medical 
interventions might not always be intended to prevent serious direct harm to large numbers of 
people; they might, for instance, be imposed in response to infectious diseases that are 
typically non-lethal. For example, it has been argued that influenza vaccinations should be 
mandatory for all health care workers, even though some have suggested that comparatively 
few deaths are attributable to the forms of influenza against which such vaccinations 
protect.liii As such, the potential scope of the harms that neurocorrectives might prevent may 
not differ significantly from those that might be prevented by interventions in IDC. 
Consider now the second and third desiderata: effectiveness and opportunity cost. It is 
reasonable to believe that some neurocorrectives will score at least as well on these desiderata 
as putatively permissible IDC interventions. Admittedly, since many of the neurocorrectives 
discussed above are only in developmental stages there is no robust data on whether these 
interventions would be effective in preventing recidivism. However, the limited data on the 
use of chemical castration to prevent recidivism in sex offenders might leave us with cause 
for optimism in this regard. In an extensive meta-analysis, Lösel and Schmucker found a 
11.1% recidivism rate amongst sex-offenders who had been castrated following the offence 
compared to a 17.5% recidivism rate amongst non-treated offenders.liv Second, there seems no 
reason to suppose that the opportunity costs associated with neurocorrectives would be any 
greater than those associated with IDC interventions. In fact neurocorrectives would be very 
similar in kind to the sorts of pharmacological interventions that might be used in IDC, and 
thus likely to involve similar resource expenditure.  
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Accordingly, it seems that some neurocorrectives would score at least as well as 
putatively permissible IDC interventions on the desiderata of effectiveness and opportunity 
cost. This suggests that, if these IDC interventions are indeed permissible, then non-
consensual neurocorrectives are not universally ruled out as impermissible by these three 
desiderata. Nevertheless, it might be argued that ‘the least restrictive alternative’ and 
proportionality desiderata rule out the use of neurocorrectives. We shall conclude by 
considering each of these desiderata in turn. 
First, however, it is necessary to explore further the nature and implications of the 
‘least restrictive alternative’ desideratum. Suppose first that we adopt the rights-based 
understanding of the desideratum explored in the previous section. An assessment of an 
intervention’s restrictiveness will then take into account the nature of the rights that the 
intervention violates, the frequency and duration of the violation, and the number of people 
whose rights are violated.lv Some comparisons of restrictiveness will be relatively 
straightforward; for instance, two interventions might differ only on one of the above 
dimensions. To illustrate, compare the use of directly observed therapy (DOT) to compelled 
treatment in IDC; the subject of DOT is required to take the prescribed dosage of his 
medication under observation.lvi Whilst DOT arguably infringes on the individual’s rights in 
important ways, it seems clear that DOT is less restrictive than compelled treatment within a 
hospital setting, holding fixed the number of doses and people affected, since it does not 
infringe upon the individual’s right to freedom of movement and association to the same 
extent, insofar as it does not involve the imposition of involuntary confinement. 
 Comparisons of the restrictiveness of different interventions become less straightforward 
when they differ on more than one dimension, for example, where one intervention violates 
right M but not right N, and the other violates right N but not right M. Similarly, comparisons 
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become less straightforward when one intervention violates the rights of more people, and the 
other violates the rights more extensively. Finally, on the harm-based interpretation of the 
desideratum, it might not always be clear how we should compare different kinds of harm.  
Nevertheless, there may be cases in which it is possible to make a somewhat credible 
comparison of the restrictiveness of the available alternative interventions. In the context of 
IDC, if our aim is to prevent further transmission of an infectious pathogen, we might 
compare compelled treatment with DOT, for example, and it might seem clear that DOT is 
less restrictive.  
In the context of using neurocorrectives in criminal justice, in order to determine whether 
or not such interventions represent the least restrictive alternative means to achieving the end 
of preventing recidivism, we must compare them with the other means available to us.  
It might be argued that a comparison of neurocorrectives with alternative means of 
preventing criminal recidivism will reveal neurocorrectives to be more restrictive than some 
available alternatives. Let us assume that we are comparing (i) subjecting one individual to a 
non-consensual neurocorrective, and (ii) subjecting the same individual to incarceration of 
the least restrictive kind necessary to retain whatever anti-recidivist effect incarceration has.lvii 
We shall also assume the rights-based understanding of the least restrictive alternative 
desideratum, although our conclusions would also hold on the harm-based understanding. 
One right that is clearly relevant to this comparison is the right to freedom of movement 
and association. Incarceration seems to infringe on an offender’s right to freedom of 
movement and association, assuming that there is such a right and that it is not waived by the 
commission of a criminal offence.lviii Moreover, infringements of this right may need to be 
continued for many years if the anti-recidivist effect is to be maintained. Neurocorrectives, by 
contrast, plausibly involve only a lesser violation of this right. Even if the offender were 
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required to present at a specified location for repeated iterations of a neurocorrective, this 
would clearly be a less extensive infringement of this right than incarceration.  
Nonetheless, it seems that there is a strong case for claiming that the use of non-
consensual neurocorrectives would be more restrictive than other penal methods because 
such interventions would violate other rights that might be deemed to be more important than 
the right to freedom of movement and association. First, insofar as neurocorrectives would 
entail some degree of physical invasion, non-consensual neurocorrectives would violate the 
offender’s right to bodily integrity in a manner that is comparable to some of the non-
consensual medical interventions surveyed above, viz. vaccinations, as well as compulsory 
medical examination and treatment. Although many jurisdictions permit non-consensual 
quarantine and isolation, which both seriously infringe upon an individuals’ rights to freedom 
of movement and association in the name of public health, such jurisdictions often prohibit 
non-consensual medical treatment, which would plausibly involve a serious violation of a 
right to bodily integrity (although it is not clear how much more serious this violation is than 
that which is involved in the non-consensual medical examinations). A plausible explanation 
for the acceptance of this position is that infringements of the right to bodily integrity are 
seen as more grave than infringements of the right to freedom of movement and association, 
ceteris paribus. 
However, it is controversial whether this is so. Indeed, Thomas Douglas has argued 
that infringements of the right to free movement and association are typically equally grave, 
given their importance to maintaining our most valuable personal relationships. Moreover, 
even if infringements of bodily integrity are more important, other things equal, this may be 
offset by a difference in the extent of the rights infringements. Incarceration involves very 
extensive intrusions on freedom of movement and association; by contrast, neurocorrectives 
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need not always involve extensive intrusions on bodily integrity (for example, of the sort 
involved in surgical procedures) but might rather involve relatively moderate forms of 
physical interference, such as, for example, the administration of a drug via nasal spray, or 
the administration of a very weak electric current (as in transcranial direct current 
stimulation).   
There is thus scope to question whether all neurocorrectives are more restrictive than 
incarceration in virtue of their physical invasiveness alone. However, another way in which 
opponents of neurocorrectives might argue that non-consensual neurocorrectives would be 
more restrictive than incarceration is by appealing to what we might term the offender’s right 
to mental integrity, or their right to have “ . . . the freedom to think one’s own thoughts and to 
have one’s own personality”.lix Whilst incarceration can undoubtedly bring about some 
mental effects, it seems that an important moral difference between incarceration and 
neurocorrectives is that when these effects are brought about during the course of 
incarceration they are mediated by psychological processes.lx In contrast, neurocorrectives 
would bring about profound mental effects directly through biological modulation of the 
brain states on which mental states supervene. Furthermore, these effects may also be 
unintended when they are brought about during the course of currently employed penal 
methods; in contrast, the intended purpose of neurocorrectives is to bring about these mental 
effects. In view of the fact that neurocorrectives involve intentionally changing another’s 
mental states, those who stress the importance of relational conditions of autonomy might 
claim that the use of neurocorrectives involves the exertion of third party control over 
another’s mental states in a way that having non-intentional effects on a prisoner’s mental 
states does not.lxi It thus seems plausible to claim that the former are more mentally invasive 
and arguably autonomy-undermining than traditional penal methods.  
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 Perhaps it is plausible to maintain that neurocorrectives are more restrictive than 
incarceration in virtue of the mental interference that they involve, or in virtue of the 
combination of physical and mental interference. Again, however, it may be possible to 
respond by conceding that rights to mental integrity and bodily integrity are more important 
than rights to freedom of movement and association, while maintaining that the extensiveness 
of the violation of the latter right involved in incarceration exceeds the extensiveness of the 
violation of the former rights involved in the administration of some neurocorrectives. After 
all, just as some neurocorrectives might be administered through means that involve only 
moderate forms of physical invasion, so too might some neurocorrectives involve only mild 
or moderate forms of mental invasion: consider a neurocorrective that has a very local effect 
on one behavioural disposition (say, towards impulsive violence) which is not central to the 
offender’s self-conception or personality.  
Perhaps more importantly though, the use of non-consensual medical interventions in 
IDC suggests that the fact that an intervention is more restrictive than an alternative is not 
alone sufficient to establish that carrying out the intervention would be impermissible (this is 
why we referred to the ‘least restrictive alternative’ desideratum as a desideratum, not a 
requirement). One of the main problems with assessing the moral justification of different 
sorts of non-consensual interventions in IDC or criminal justice is that there will often be 
trade-offs between the desiderata that we delineated in the previous section. In particular, in 
many cases it is likely that there will be a trade-off between the effectiveness of an 
intervention and its restrictiveness. For instance, in the context of IDC, although DOT is less 
restrictive than compelled treatment, it also gives subjects more of an opportunity to avoid 
taking their medication. In such cases, we must judge that the least restrictive alternative is 
going to be sufficiently effective in achieving its aim to warrant our employing that 
intervention instead of a more restrictive alternative that is likely to be more effective. 
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The above considerations present a problem for opponents of neurocorrectives, since it is 
widely agreed that incarceration is ineffective at preventing recidivism amongst criminal 
offenders. lxii A similar charge can be made against psycho-social rehabilitation. Consider, for 
example, the use of such programmes in the context of sexual offenders. Despite the wide use 
of these programmes amongst this population of offenders, a number of critics have argued 
that there is simply no good evidence that such programmes are effective in preventing re-
offending.lxiii With this in mind, even if a non-consensual neurocorrective is not the least 
restrictive means of preventing recidivism available, the use of such an intervention may 
nonetheless be morally permissible according to the moral framework outlined above, if this 
intervention is substantially more effective at preventing recidivism than other less restrictive 
means of achieving that end.  
One way in which an opponent of neurocorrectives might respond to this point is to 
appeal to the proportionality desideratum. It might be argued that interventions with a degree 
of restrictiveness that is above a proportionality threshold would be ruled impermissible, even 
if they are the least restrictive of the available alternatives, or offer the best combination of 
restrictiveness and effectiveness. It could then be argued that neurocorrectives would, in 
virtue of their physical and mental invasiveness invariably fall above this threshold. 
Moreover, it might be argued that many IDC interventions are dis-analogous with 
neurocorrectives on this front; since many IDC interventions benefit their victim in some 
sense (in so far as they might treat the individual or prevent them from suffering an infectious 
disease), they are generally less restrictive, all things considered, than neurocorrectives, and 
are more likely to fall below a proportionality threshold of the sort that we are discussing 
here.	  lxiv     
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At this juncture, it seems that the particular interpretation of the proportionality 
desideratum becomes particularly salient. Consider first the equivalent harm view of 
proportionality. On this view, the use of a non-consensual neurocorrective will only be 
proportionate if it prevents harms that are comparable to the harm caused by the intervention. 
As we have explained above, it seems that the use of some (although not all) non-consensual 
neurocorrectives might involve profound harms. It might be claimed that this restricts the 
scope of morally permissible non-consensual neurocorrectives to scenarios in which they are 
expected to prevent a similar degree of harm.  
However, as we have seen, other interpretations of the proportionality desideratum 
allow that it can be permissible to impose harms on a threatening party that are greater than 
the harm that they themselves pose. On these accounts, if a criminal offender is believed to 
culpably pose a significant risk to the life of just one other person, then that may be enough to 
justify imposing significantly harmful preventative interventions on him. Crucially for our 
purposes, unlike many recipients of IDC interventions, it seems that the recipients of 
neurocorrectives can plausibly be understood to culpably pose a threat in a way that may 
plausibly justify imposing a harm on them that is greater than the harm that they themselves 
threaten to bring about. Moreover, as we have seen, significantly restrictive interventions 
have often been thought permissible in the context of IDC. These factors together casts 
significant doubt on the suggestion that neurocorrectives would invariably lie above the 
proportionality threshold.  
	  
Conclusion	  
 
Drawing on two theoretical frameworks, we have delineated five desiderata that are 
often thought apt to guide moral assessments of non-consensual medical interventions in the 
	   27	  
context of IDC. We then employed these desiderata to assess the moral justifiability of non-
consensual medical interventions performed for the purposes of criminal rehabilitation. We 
argued that at least some neurocorrectives could be highly effective at preventing 
considerable harms with few opportunity costs, thus satisfying three of the desiderata to a 
high degree. Having said that, we pointed out that, even though neurocorrectives need not 
always involve profound harms to the recipient of the sort that are described in the literature, 
they may not be the least restrictive alternative rehabilitative measure available. However, in 
assessing the non-consensual use of such interventions, considerations of restrictiveness must 
be weighed against the desideratum of effectiveness; even if less restrictive rehabilitative 
alternatives are available, we may nonetheless have sufficient reason to use neurocorrectives 
if they are more effective in preventing recidivism. Finally, we suggested that the fact that 
many serious criminal offenders are culpable for the threat of future harm that they pose 
suggests that significantly restrictive preventative interventions may satisfy the 
proportionality desideratum on plausible justice-based accounts of proportionality. 
One concern that might be raised in response to our arguments is that they might 
plausibly be extended to justify the use of non-consensual crime-preventing medical 
interventions on individuals who have not previously committed a criminal offence, but who 
are still predicted to pose a threat of significant harm. This might be deemed problematic in 
our current political and legal culture, in which we are reluctant to punish people for their 
states of character, and instead believe that sanction should be imposed for conduct. Although 
we cannot offer a full treatment of this issue here, it should be noted that our arguments do 
not extend straightforwardly to this practice. Currently, one significant barrier to reliably 
predicting the risk of offending amongst non-offenders is that one of the main statistical 
predictors of future criminal offending is past criminal offending; for obvious reasons, this 
predictive factor would be absent in the risk assessment of non-offenders. Given the 
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potentiality for error and abuse, and the various reasons we have to try and minimize the 
extent to which the state may legitimately exercise coercive power over citizens, this 
epistemological barrier represents a sufficient reason to only permit the use of 
neurointerventions as a post-conviction sanction. 
However, we suggest that this barrier is epistemological rather than moral. Suppose, 
completely fantastically, that we could, with 100% accuracy and reliability, predict with that 
an individual with no history of criminal offending will culpably bring about a significant 
harm, and that psycho-social rehabilitation would not be effective in preventing him from 
doing so. What should we do in the absence of the epistemological barrier?  Whilst we should 
be wary of state abuse of this power, in the theoretically pure case of a thought experiment, 
we suggest that the ‘bullet’ of believing that it could be morally permissible to carry out a 
non-consensual neurocorrective on such an individual to prevent this harm becomes easier to 
bite; it is difficult to see how the mere fact that this person’s criminal offence lies in the 
future rather than the past should be an impediment to preventing the harm that they will 
certainly otherwise bring about.  
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  they	  bear	  some	  degree	  of	  moral	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responsibility	  for	  posing	  a	  threat	  of	  harm.	  For	  instance,	  McMahan	  suggests	  that	  an	  agent	  who	  poses	  a	  threat	  of	  
harm	  because	  he	  is	  acting	  under	  irresistible	  may	  still	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  act	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  
culpable;	  this	  is	  sufficient	  to	  render	  them	  liable	  to	  some	  degree	  of	  defensive	  harm	  on	  his	  view,	  although	  the	  
proportionality	  restriction	  on	  that	  defensive	  harm	  will	  be	  more	  stringent	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
culpable.	  See	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  159–173.	  
xxxviii	  Uniacke,	  “Proportionality	  and	  Self-­‐Defense,”	  261.	  
xxxix	  McMahan,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Culpability,”	  766;	  McMahan,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing,	  401–411;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  
in	  War,	  Ch.	  4.	  
xl	  McMahan,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing,	  412;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  Ch.4;	  McMahan,	  “Proportionate	  Defense.”	  
xli	  It	  is	  merely	  an	  indicator,	  rather	  than	  a	  determinant,	  because	  the	  intervention	  may	  also	  cause	  or	  prevent	  
other	  harms	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  consequentialist	  calculus,	  and	  because	  deontological	  side	  
constraints	  may	  rule	  the	  intervention	  out	  even	  if	  it	  satisfies	  this	  desideratum.	  	  
xlii	  See	  Miller,	  Social	  Justice	  for	  an	  influential	  desert-­‐based	  theory	  of	  social	  justice;	  See	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  
for	  criticisms	  of	  desert-­‐based	  theories.	  
xliii	  Indeed,	  a	  consequentialist	  theory	  of	  this	  stripe	  could	  hold	  that	  harms	  to	  culpable	  agents	  contribute	  
positively	  to	  the	  overall	  good.	  	  
xlivMcMahan	  draws	  a	  similar	  distinction	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  proportionality	  in	  
punishment	  and	  self-­‐defence.	  See	  	  McMahan,	  “Proportionate	  Defense,”	  22–23.	  
xlv	  Bentham,	  Theory	  of	  Legislation;	  Cullen,	  Reaffirming	  Rehabilitation;	  Carlen,	  “Crime,	  Inequality	  and	  
Sentencing.”	  
xlvi	  Hampton,	  “The	  Moral	  Education	  Theory	  of	  Punishment”;	  Morris,	  “A	  Paternalistic	  Theory	  of	  Punishment.”	  
xlvii	  Golash,	  The	  Case	  against	  Punishment,	  ch	  5.	  
xlviii	  Notice	  that	  even	  if	  one	  holds	  that	  criminal	  justice	  should	  not	  at	  all	  aim	  at	  rehabilitation,	  our	  argument	  will	  
still	  have	  interesting	  implications.	  That	  public	  health	  ethics	  justifications	  for	  non-­‐consensual	  interventions	  
seem	  also	  to	  work	  for	  CPNs	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  for	  using	  CPNs.	  Thus,	  even	  if	  one	  thinks	  
that	  the	  latter	  could	  not	  permissibly	  be	  incorporated	  within	  criminal	  justice	  systems,	  our	  arguments	  suggest	  
that	  there	  may	  be	  reasons	  to	  use	  CPNs	  outside	  of	  criminal	  justice,	  for	  instance,	  as	  part	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  
separate	  public	  protection	  system.	  	  
	  
xlix	  UK	  Gov,	  “Reducing	  Reoffending	  and	  Improving	  Rehabilitation	  -­‐	  Policy	  -­‐	  GOV.UK.”	  
l	  Douglas	  et	  al.,	  “Assessing	  Violence	  Risk”;	  Fazel	  et	  al.,	  “Use	  of	  Risk	  Assessment	  Instruments	  to	  Predict	  Violence	  
and	  Antisocial	  Behaviour	  in	  73	  Samples	  Involving	  24	  827	  People”;	  Harrison,	  “Dangerous	  Offenders,	  
Indeterminate	  Sentencing,	  and	  the	  Rehabilitation	  Revolution.”	  
li	  See	  Douglas	  et	  al.,	  “Assessing	  Violence	  Risk”	  for	  discussion.	  
lii	  A	  further	  higher	  order	  problem	  with	  actuarial	  instruments	  is	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  difficulties	  in	  
measuring	  their	  predictive	  accuracy.	  See	  Rice	  and	  Harris,	  “Violent	  Recidivism.”.	  
liii	  Offley,	  “Should	  Influenza	  Vaccination	  Be	  Mandatory	  for	  Healthcare	  Workers?”;	  Doshi,	  “Influenza.”	  
liv	  	  It	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  figure	  quoted	  above	  refers	  to	  a	  sample	  that	  includes	  offenders	  who	  
have	  received	  either	  chemical	  or	  physical	  castration.	  
lv	  Gostin,	  Public	  Health	  Law,	  68.	  
lvi	  DOT	  has	  commonly	  been	  used	  for	  patients	  suffering	  from	  tuberculosis,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  occasionally	  used	  in	  the	  
treatment	  of	  HIV.	  See	  Ja	  et	  al.,	  “Directly	  Observed	  Therapy	  (DOT)	  for	  Individuals	  with	  HIV”;	  Bayer,	  Wilkinson,	  
and	  Bayer,	  “Directly	  Observed	  Therapy	  for	  Tuberculosis.”.	  
lvii	   Note	   that	   the	   least	   restrictive	   kind	   of	   incarceration	   compatible	   with	   it	   retaining	   its	   anti-­‐recidivist	   effect	  
would	  plausibly	  be	  far	  less	  restrictive	  than	  prevailing	  kinds	  of	  incarceration,	  which	  arguably	  involve	  harms	  and	  
rights	  violations	  that	  are	  gratuitous	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  preventing	  recidivism,	  and	  indeed	  may	  serve	  to	  
encourage	   it.	   It	  might	  be	  objected	  at	  this	  point	  that	  taking	   incarceration	  as	  the	  relevant	  comparator	   is	   illicit,	  
since	  criminal	  justice	  systems	  frequently	  have	  at	  their	  disposal	  less	  restrictive	  means	  of	  preventing	  recidivism,	  
such	  as	  psycho-­‐social	  rehabilitation	  programmes.	  We	  will	  respond	  to	  this	  objection	  in	  our	  discussion	  below	  by	  
appealing	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   desideratum	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	   least	   restrictive	  
alternative	  desideratum.	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lviii	  Of	  course,	  on	  most	  accounts	  of	  punishment,	  the	  prevention	  of	  recidivism	  is	  not	  the	  only	  justification	  for	  
incarcerating	  criminal	  offenders.	  Incarceration	  might	  also	  serve	  retributive	  and	  deterrent	  purposes.	  However,	  
in	  cases	  of	  civil	  commitment,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  primary	  justification	  of	  incarceration	  is	  to	  prevent	  recidivism.	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  Smith,	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lxiii	  Ho	  and	  Ross,	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  for	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  Good	  to	  Be	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lxiv	  However,	  there	  are	  other	  contexts	  in	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  interventions	  that	  seem	  comparably	  restrictive	  to	  
neurocorrectives	  are	  used	  non-­‐consensually	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  similarly	  problematic	  harms.	  For	  instance,	  
many	  jurisdictions	  have	  mental	  health	  legislation	  that	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  competent	  but	  mentally	  disordered	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  to	  
be	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  with	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  a	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  to	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